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Abstract  
 Using World Values Survey data (2010-2-13) on a selected number 
of Arab countries, this article explains that Social Capital is an important 
determinant of social and political stability. In the aftermath of what is 
commonly called Arab Spring, 3 groups of 13 countries with different levels 
of stability are compared using Putnam’s 4 dimensions of social capital: 
Interpersonal Trust, Institutional Trust, Civic Engagement and 
Trustworthiness. On average, respondents of these countries mainly trust 
their family members, lack confidence in their governments, are not active 
members in social organizations, and rarely find illicit acts as justifiable. 
These four dimensions are then used in a probit regression to explain the 
occurrence of robberies. Our model shows that both civic norms and levels 
of trust have a negative and significant impact on property crimes, and that 
social capital could be considered as a predictor of social order. 
“Trustworthiness” had the highest explanatory power, especially civic norms 
that proscribe stealing properties. 
 
Keywords: Social capital - Civic engagement - Trust - Political stability – 
Arab Spring 
 
Introduction 
 The current context of Arab revolutions is a propitious moment to 
reexamine the legitimacy crisis threatening contemporary democracies, in a 
context of significant rise in social and political violence, with higher levels 
of crime, terrorism, and state repression.  
 Following Becker, most economists consider decisions of crime as 
the result of a rational individual calculus [Becker, 1968]. But social 
disorganization, social mistrust, ineffective social norms or social sanctions, 
as well as varying levels of social and political control are major 
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determinants of physical violence and property crime. For example, crimes 
and robberies may be the result of imitation of peers’ behavior and they may 
be influenced by the level of social normal constraining individual choice, as 
in Glaeser et al. (1996), Patacchini and Zenou (2005), Haynie (2001) and 
Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005). High levels of violence may lead to the 
revocation of the social contract, with a risk of total annihilation of social ties 
as it may happen in civil wars or famines [Sen, 2003; 2006]. Hobbes was the 
first to state the problem of order as a social contract by which all individuals 
agree to abandon simultaneously the use of violence in their interpersonal 
affairs, delegating this power to a central authority. But a stable political 
order is not always achieved and, in a context of widespread distrust and 
opportunism, it is difficult to understand how a normative agreement on the 
collective action could be reached. 
 Our article addresses the problem of social disorder and political 
violence, following the concept of social capital, arguing that mutual trust 
and social norms could be an appropriate solution to the Hobbesian problem 
[Coleman, 1990]. Social capital is mainly defined by its components, all 
having in common the aptitude of reducing the level of social and political 
violence. James Coleman insisted on three components: mutual obligations 
and expectations, information channels and, above all, social norms 
especially norms of reciprocity [Coleman, 1988].  
 Our aim in this article is to study the relation between social capital 
and social violence in Arab countries. We show that some components of 
social capital could explain the stability of the social order, as well as the 
establishment of State authority and shifts in the political system. Thus, we 
follow Robert Putnam (1993) who referred to 4 dimensions of social capital: 
Interpersonal Trust, Institutional Trust, Civic Engagement and 
Trustworthiness. We use the World Values Survey Wave 5 which provide 
data on thousands of respondents from 13 Arab countries, between 2010 and 
2013. This period of time coincides with major unrest in most Arab 
countries, commonly labelled as “Arab Springs”. The empirical study shows 
that components of social capital explain political stability, social order, and 
especially the right to private property as it may be measured by the level of 
crime and robberies. “Trustworthiness” is the component that has the highest 
explanatory power, especially civic norms that proscribe stealing properties. 
 
Literature review  
 Through the concept of social capital, Coleman showed that 
contemporary societies are suffering from the erosion of their primordial 
social structure, with a dramatic decrease in the primordial social ties (related 
to families, neighborhoods, churches, etc.). Coleman showed that this 
primordial social capital used to protect in the past individuals and groups, 
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preserving their rights and interests within collective structures. Due to the 
lack of substitutes in modern structures, individuals are more isolated, left 
alone to face emerging Corporate Actors, supra-individual actors (such as 
firms, big corporations, NGO’s, State organizations, etc.) threatening the 
autonomy and liberty of isolated individuals. How can we ensure that 
individuals, while increasingly subordinated to corporate actors, continue to 
collectively control the latter?  
 Social capital could be considered as a solution the problem of 
collective action. The problem of Hobbes could be reconstructed in terms of 
social cooperation that aims at protecting individual from illegitimate 
violence. In the absence of a social contract, Hobbes believes that every 
individual grants himself the right to avenge the harm done to him. The 
generalization of such violence leads to a “war of all against all”, giving birth 
to a strong demand for a "social order”. Yet this demand may not be met 
with an adequate supply. The social contract has all the characteristics of a 
"public good" under which all actors simultaneously abandon the “natural 
right” to harm others [Coleman, 1990]. Hobbes stipulated that the transition 
from the “state of nature” to a "state of social contract" is reached through 
individual rational decisions. Furthermore, Oliver Williamson analyze 
institutional arrangements that prevent people from opportunistic behavior, 
when violence is too expensive for a rational individual agent. According to 
Granovetter, Williamson’s institutions are not intended to create social trust, 
since they are functional substitutes to trust. Therefore, the problem of 
Hobbes is still unsolved: how to explain that some societies established a 
solid (and lasting) political and social stability while others are permanently 
experiencing political violence with high level of social disorganization? 
 In his reconstruction of the Hobbesian social order, Coleman showed 
that the problem lies in a collective failure, a defection that any public good 
may encounter: it is impossible to reach a contract between egoistic unsocial 
agents, even though it is in the interest of all participants, due to the free-
riding behavior. As shown by game theory, the “defection strategy” in the 
prisoner’s dilemma leads to the failure of the collective action. This extended 
defection leads to the perpetuation of violence, and the social order is not 
reached due to the general mistrust and mutual aversion [Coleman, 1990]. 
 In a context of widespread distrust, the defection strategy and the 
violent behavior are rational choices for the uncivic agent. All collective 
initiatives face this same defection problem, and the Hobbesian problem 
should be overcome by every social group defending collective interests, 
from unions to charitable organizations, from neighborhood association to 
political parties [Olson, 1966]. As suggested by Coleman, social capital 
seems to be the appropriate solution that allows groups and communities to 
move from a situation of "double failure" to a situation of double success, 
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benefiting all parties. Mutual trust and norms of reciprocity lead us to 
optimistic, yet winning, mutual expectations. All other components of social 
capital (such as sanctions, threats, promises, rumors, etc.) allow individuals 
to establish better social cooperation, with a more stable social order. 
 Social capital “refers to features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions.” [Putnam et al., 1993, p. 167]. Social capital 
is thus defined by its components as well as by their functions. Networks of 
social trust establish mutual obligations and optimistic expectations that 
guide the social action toward a better coordination. Trust may explain, for 
example, how credits are allocated in a context of high uncertainty. By 
honoring his obligations, each actor expects that others will also respect their 
obligations. Cooperation is possible if the trustee and the trustor 
continuously prove that they are both trustworthy. [Coleman, 1988, p. S103].  
 Among all components of social capital, social norms are the major 
resources for collective actions [Putnam et al., 1993]. Stable norms of 
reciprocity and cooperation are needed for a better economic development 
and a democratic governance [Putnam 1995, a, b]. Norms explain differences 
in performance between groups, showing how some communities can 
mobilize their social resources more easily to achieve common goals 
[Coleman, 1990]. Therefore, social capital stresses on the idea of “power 
available to people”, describing how individuals and groups are still capable 
of framing their lives, echoing with the concept of "capabilities" as 
developed by Sen (2006), showing how we actively shape our living 
conditions, by making choices that transform our social structures as much as 
we are influenced by them.   
 
Methodology 
 This article uses data from the World Values Survey (WVS) 2010-
2013 wave covering some Arab countries which are included in the survey. 
The data selected has been divided into 3 categories of 13 countries. 
Countries which have known recent turmoil (after 2011) such as Egypt, 
Libya, Tunisia and Yemen are referred to as Group1. We compare these 
Arab Spring countries to two different groups: Group 2 refers to countries 
having unstable security levels such as Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Palestine, and Group 3 to countries with relatively stable and secure 
situations such as Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Qatar. While it is 
very important to include the case of an emblematic country where the 
revolution is still going on, unfortunately WVS data on Syria is missing. 
 The empirical study is divided into 2 parts. The first part uses WVS 
data to compare between different dimensions of social capital among the 
selected Arab countries. The second part uses data to explain the relationship 
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between social capital and social order. The components of social capital will 
be used to explain crime against property right, which we measure through 
percentage of respondents having been victim of a robbery within each 
country (V171). 
 We considered that the occurrence of robberies is a proxy for social 
order, since safety and the level of social organization in a country, town, or 
neighborhood may be measured by percentage of people not being victim of 
robberies as in [Rose & Clear, 1998; Buonanno & al. 2006]. Other studies 
measure the effectiveness of social capital in promoting social order by 
assessing how some components of the social capital can help preventing 
crime [Saegart, Winkel, Swartz, 2002]. Although the relation between 
robberies and social order may be robbery-specific, we considered here that 
occurrence of robberies is an indicator of safety and trust within the 
neighborhood, assuming that the total absence of robberies is the sign of a 
high level of organization. Our model shows that both civic norms and levels 
of trust have a negative and significant impact on property crimes. This 
shows that social capital could be considered as a predictor of social order. 
Putnam used robberies as a proxy to study the relation between social capital 
and social organization, in different contexts, from Italy to San Jose, Costa 
Rica [Putnam, 1993]. He concluded that the high level of trust and civic 
norms could facilitate a horizontal social organization, instead of imposing 
the social order through police-state control or repression. 
 Following Paxton (1999) and Knack and Keefer (1997), the 
measurement of social capital covers four dimensions: Interpersonal Trust, 
Institutional trust, Civic Participation and Trustworthiness. Interpersonal 
trust refers to Trust that lies within networks of mutual obligations and 
expectations. It measures strong ties among primordial social capital and 
weak ties across kinship groups, by two variables: trust in people from one’s 
family (V102) and trust in people met for the first time (V105). 
  Institutional trust refers to the confidence in institutions and 
institutional performance as well as confidence in public information. It 
measures Trust in local government (V115), media and press, as well as trust 
in political parties, church and national government. 
 Participation to the civil society and its organizations measures the 
strength of norms of civic engagement assess: volunteering, membership in 
voluntary associations, sport and art clubs, humanitarian associations, or 
professional organization and political parties. 
 Finally, trustworthiness assesses confidence and norms of reciprocity 
indicating how people are expected to behave towards each other and how 
every person expects others to behave, thus shaping the overall rules and 
sanctions that are effectively observed by all members of the social activity. 
This shows to what extent people in a society are willing to cooperate with 
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one another by measuring how much it is normal to steal property (V200), 
avoid paying fees, or cheating in paying taxes.  
  
Descriptive statistics 
Trustworthiness: civic norms and norms of reciprocity 
 Since social norms are considered as the major components of social 
capital, we start our description of social structures in Arab countries by 
measuring to which extent people judge some public behavior as normal, and 
to which extent they justify uncivic behaviors. Variables V198 to V202 
attempt to measure civic norms prevailing in each country. Respondents 
were asked to rank from 1: “Never Justifiable” to 10: “Always justifiable” 
acts like stealing property, accepting a bribe, suicide… The variables that 
have been chosen represent a series of behavior which deal with public 
order. All these variables may in some cases refer to each other, showing 
how people expect each other to behave in prisoner's dilemma contexts, thus 
contributing or not to the establishment of the social order.  
 Mean results are summarized in table 1. Arab Spring countries 
achieve the lowest mean scores (low justification levels on all behaviors) and 
the lowest scores per country group. This shows a low level of tolerance for 
illegal or illicit behavior. Socio economic variables such as sex, education 
level, age and social class add no remarkable differences to these results on 
average (see Appendix 1). If we take in consideration the variable “How 
justifiable it is to steal property” (V200), we find that Tunisia ranks first and 
more generally, Arab Spring countries have less tolerance than most of other 
countries, while Algeria and Lebanon have the highest level of tolerance. 
When calculating the mean of the 5 variables, we find that group 1 countries 
have a relatively high level of civic norms, comparable to that of stable 
countries such as Qatar and Jordan, while Algeria and Lebanon have the 
lowest levels of civic norms. 
  
Justifiable: 
Claiming 
governmen
t benefits 
to which 
you are not 
entitled 
Justifiable: 
Avoiding a 
fare on 
public 
transport 
 Justifiable: 
Stealing 
property 
 
Justifiable: 
Cheating 
on taxes if 
you have a 
chance 
Justifiable: 
Someone 
accepting a 
bribe in the 
course of 
their duties 
Mean 
Egypt 2.79 2.21 1.94 1.93 1.88 2.15 
Libya 2.36 2.36 1.62 1.64 1.53 1.90 
Tunisia 2.09 2.71 1.21 2.31 1.40 1.95 
Yemen 2.47 1.90 1.49 2.21 1.55 1.92 
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MEAN 2.42 2.29 1.57 2.02 1.59 1.98 
Bahrain 2.11 2.09 2.11   2.11 2.11 
Iraq 2.80 2.42 1.62 2.88 1.73 2.29 
Lebano
n 
3.92 2.86 2.63 3.18 2.76 3.07 
Palestin
e 
3.53 2.50 1.68 2.94 1.74 2.48 
MEAN 2.96 2.43 1.92 2.76 1.99 2.41 
Algeria 4.43 4.40 2.20 3.88 2.23 3.43 
Jordan 2.25 1.59 1.36 1.65 1.45 1.66 
Kuwait 3.88 2.61 2.04 2.89 2.42 2.77 
Morocc
o 
1.99 1.68 1.40 1.51 1.47 1.61 
Qatar 3.27 1.87 1.46   1.38 1.99 
MEAN 3.16 2.43 1.69 2.48 1.79 2.31 
Table 1- Mean scores for Trustworthiness 
 
Interpersonal Trust 
 In most studies, the level of interpersonal trust is calculated through 
the percentage of respondents in each country replying that people can be 
trusted, whether we are talking about family, neighbors, foreigners, etc. We 
chose to analyze the level of personal trust through two variables. 
Percentages of people who trust and people who don’t trust have been 
computed for each country in the sample regarding the following 2 
questions: 
 V102- “How much do you trust your family?” 
 V105- “How much do you trust people you meet for the first time?” 
 Table 2 shows that there are no major differences between Groups 1 
and 3 with a slight difference for Group 2 (with statistically significant chi-
square testing). Most people in the selected Arab countries trust their family 
and don’t trust people they meet for the first time. Once again, we find that 
Arab Spring countries have the highest level of trust toward family, a level 
that is comparable to that of stable Arab monarchies, with Egypt ranking first 
while Lebanon has the lowest level of trust toward family, followed by 
Bahrain. On another hand, when comparing levels of trust toward people met 
the first time, we find that Bahrain has the highest level of trust, and 
countries such as Morocco, Palestine and Algeria have the lowest levels. 
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V102 - How much you trust: Your family 
V105- How much you trust: People you 
meet for the first time 
 Trust 
Don’t 
Trust 
N Trust 
Don’t 
Trust 
N 
Egypt 99.90% 0.20% 1,523 31.06% 68.94% 1,523 
Libya 99.20% 0.90% 2,128 21.12% 78.88% 2,079 
Tunisia 98.60% 1.50% 1,200 17.16% 82.84% 1,189 
Yemen 98.60% 1.40% 997 24.72% 75.28% 983 
MEAN 99.08% 1.00%   23.51% 76.49%   
Bahrain 89.20% 10.70% 1,199 52.93% 47.07% 1,196 
Iraq 99.80% 0.30% 1,199 16.53% 83.47% 1,186 
Lebanon 82.50% 17.50% 1,177 29.21% 70.79% 1,171 
Palestine 98.10% 1.90% 997 14.91% 85.09% 979 
MEAN 92.40% 7.60%   28.39% 71.61%   
Algeria 97.20% 2.80% 1,191 15.66% 84.34% 1,156 
Jordan 98.70% 1.30% 1,200 22.16% 77.84% 1,196 
Kuwait 98.20% 1.80% 1,280 31.93% 68.07% 1,256 
Morocco 98.50% 1.50% 1,196 14.13% 85.87% 1,182 
Qatar 98.40% 1.60% 1,058 33.05% 66.95% 1,059 
MEAN 98.20% 1.80%   23.38% 76.62%   
Table 2: Interpersonal Trust in selected Arab countries 
  
Institutional Trust 
 Variables V108 to V124 measure the level of confidence in some 
institutions: the armed forces, television, the press, etc. Variable V115 
(CONF_GOV) measures specifically the level of confidence in the 
government “How much confidence you have in the government in your 
nation’s capital?”. Answers range from 1: A great deal to 4: Not at all. Mean 
answers of the selected Arab countries are summarized in Table 3, showing 
that confidence level increases with stability. Mean levels show that people 
across countries have more confidence in institutions other than their 
government (CONF_INST) except in group 3. 
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Confidence: The government 
(in your nation’s capital) 
Confidence in other 
institutions 
Egypt 2.69 2.73 
Libya 2.97 2.64 
Tunisia 3.22 2.91 
Yemen 2.92 2.96 
MEAN 2.95 2.81 
Bahrain 2.09 2.10 
Iraq 2.73 2.65 
Lebanon 3.05 2.72 
Palestine 2.74 2.70 
MEAN 2.65 2.54 
Algeria 2.70 2.69 
Jordan 2.34 2.56 
Kuwait 2.12 2.31 
Morocco 2.50 2.39 
Qatar 1.66 1.78 
MEAN 2.26 2.35 
Table 3: Mean Confidence in Institutions in Arab countries 
 
 Confidence levels are the lowest in Arab Spring countries and the 
highest in relatively stable countries. In Table 4 below, when comparing 
these variables to the World Bank Index of political stability in the same 
countries over the period 2010-2014, we find that higher levels of confidence 
are associated with more political stability, except for Tunisia, the only Arab 
Spring country that has reached a stable political system, yet still scoring a 
very low level of confidence in Institutions.  
Rank by political stability COUNTRY POL_STAB CONF_GOV CONF_INST 
1 Qatar 1.13 1.66 1.54 
2 Kuwait 0.24 2.12 2.24 
3 Morocco -0.43 2.5 2.37 
4 Jordan -0.5 2.34 2.23 
5 Tunisia -0.59 3.22 2.72 
6 Bahrain -0.98 2.09 2.1 
7 Algeria -1.26 2.7 2.56 
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8 Libya -1.4 2.97 2.62 
9 Egypt -1.41 2.69 2.6 
10 Lebanon -1.65 3.05 2.71 
11 Palestine -1.91 2.74 2.61 
12 Iraq -2.11 2.73 2.55 
13 Yemen -2.44 2.92 3 
Table 4: Political Stability and Confidence levels 
 
Civic engagement: membership and participation in civil society 
 Variables V25 to V35 measure the respondents’ civic engagement 
through their participation to several social organizations. The answers range 
from “not a member”, to “inactive member” and “active member”. The table 
5 below shows the percentage of “non-members” among respondents. 
 
Chu
rch 
or 
reli
giou
s  
Spo
rt 
or 
recr
eati
ona
l  
Ar
t, 
mu
sic 
or 
ed
uc
ati
on
al 
Labo
r 
Unio
n 
Pol
itic
al 
Par
ty 
Envir
onme
ntal  
Profe
ssion
al  
Hum
anitar
ian or 
charit
able  
Con
sum
er  
Self-
help 
grou
p, 
mut
ual 
aid 
grou
p 
Other  
 Me
an 
Egypt 
98.8
8 
99.
80 
99.
80 
99.80 
98.
62 
99.80 99.61 99.21 
99.8
7 
99.8
0 
99.80 
99.
55 
Libya 90.0
1 
81.
97 
88.
81 
88.06 92.
99 
90.54 88.64 80.63 90.7
5 
87.5
9 
92.52 88.
41 
Tunisia 98.4
2 
94.
52 
96.
10 
98.09 98.
26 
99.25 98.17 98.92 99.5
0 
99.5
9 
99.92 98.
25 
Yemen 91.8
0 
94.
70 
96.
10 
95.90 80.
10 
96.50 92.80 91.20 95.7
0 
93.3
0 
100.0
0 
93.
46 
MEAN 94.7
8 
92.
75 
95.
20 
95.46 92.
49 
96.52 94.80 92.49 96.4
6 
95.0
7 
98.06 94.
92 
Bahrain 76.3
3 
72.
17 
70.
00 
79.58  79.00 56.50 79.08 81.3
3 
81.8
3 
60.00 73.
58 
Iraq 90.0
0 
93.
58 
96.
50 
97.58 96.
92 
98.42 96.08 91.17 98.8
3 
95.6
7 
99.83 95.
87 
Lebanon 77.7
5 
74.
75 
76.
00 
82.75 77.
83 
83.58 82.75 79.25 87.1
7 
83.0
0 
86.67 81.
05 
Palestine 82.3
3 
82.
75 
87.
30 
87.35 81.
09 
91.54 89.21 87.12 93.3
7 
91.9
2 
95.36 88.
12 
MEAN 81.6
0 
80.
81 
82.
45 
86.82 85.
28 
88.14 81.14 84.16 90.1
8 
88.1
0 
85.46 84.
92 
Algeria 91.6
7 
88.
67 
93.
58 
96.08 96.
92 
97.67 97.17 94.33 98.0
8 
97.3
3 
97.50 95.
36 
Jordan 89.2
5 
91.
75 
94.
58 
94.75 95.
17 
94.67 92.67 90.67 95.5
0 
94.0
8 
99.42 93.
86 
Kuwait 72.8
5 
74.
54 
85.
18 
  88.75 76.63 72.12 84.5
4 
85.4
6 
93.01 81.
45 
Morocco 96.5
8 
91.
03 
95.
10 
97.36 96.
68 
98.47 96.22 97.54 98.9
5 
97.7
2 
95.11 96.
43 
Qatar 81.1
3 
78.
58 
86.
32 
  86.89  78.21 88.0
2 
81.9
8 
90.94 84.
01 
MEAN 86.3
0 
84.
91 
90.
95 
96.07 96.
25 
93.29 90.67 86.57 93.0
2 
91.3
2 
95.20 91.
32 Table 5: Non-Membership percentages in organizations 
 
 Non-memberships averages are the lowest for group 2, chronically 
unstable countries. Highest scores concern Arab Spring countries, which 
seem to have the lowest level of this aspect of social capital compared to 
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other Arab countries, while the highest participation to the civil society is 
found in Bahrain, followed by Lebanon, Kuwait and Qatar. 
 
Conclusion to the descriptive analysis 
 Stable countries from group 3 such as Qatar and Kuwait have the 
highest level of political stability (ranked 1 and 2 respectively), and the 
lowest level of robberies (ranked 1 and 3 respectively - table 6 below), as 
well as high level of trust toward people met for the first time (rank 2 and 3 
respectively). On the other hand, countries from group 2 such as Bahrain and 
Lebanon suffer from political instability (ranked 6 and 10 respectively), and 
relatively high level of robberies (ranked 7 and 11 respectively), with the 
lowest level of trust toward family (rank 12 and 13 respectively) and high 
level of trust toward people met for the first time (rank 1 and 5 respectively). 
  Rank by Robberies level COUNTRY ROBBERIES 
1 Qatar 6.90% 
2 Libya 10.70% 
3 Kuwait 22.80% 
4 Iraq 23.50% 
5 Yemen 23.90% 
6 Tunisia 26.50% 
7 Bahrain 28.40% 
8 Morocco 30.70% 
9 Palestine 30.70% 
10 Jordan 31.90% 
11 Lebanon 43.00% 
12 Algeria 43.30% 
13 Egypt 49.40% 
Table 6: percentage of respondents having been victim of a robbery within each country - 
V171 
 
 Finally, Arab spring countries from group 1 are in an intermediate 
position. The social capital of these countries is mainly composed of the 
other two dimensions, interpersonal trust and social norms, with low level of 
institutional trust, especially low confidence in the government, and low 
participation to the civil society. Indeed, these countries have the lowest 
levels of political stability (except for Tunisia, only country to reach a stable 
political system after the revolution), and the lowest levels of confidence in 
their respective government (Tunisia ranking first, as the having the lowest 
level of confidence in the government and all other institutions). These 
countries also have the lowest participation to the civil society (Egypt has the 
lowest levels of participation to voluntary associations, followed by Tunisia). 
But they have the highest level of trust in family members (Egypt ranking 1, 
Libya 3, Tunisia 5, and Yemen 6). Moreover, these are the less tolerant Arab 
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countries toward deviant behavior, Tunisia being the least tolerant toward 
stealing property. 
 
Regression analysis 
 This section attempts to explain to which extent the four dimensions 
of social capital influence social order. We use a probit regression and we 
report marginal effects of four independent variables on a binary dependent 
variable summarized in table 7: 
Variable Related question in WVS 
  
Observati
ons 
Perce
nt 
Recod
ed 
ROBBERIES(dep
endent)  
V171- How frequently do 
the following things 
occur in your 
neighborhood: Robberies 
Very 
Frequently/Quit
e frequently 
4520 28% 1 
Not 
frequently/Not 
at all frequently 
11589 72% 0 
N 16109 98.1   
TRUST_FAMIL
Y 
V102-How much you 
trust your family 
Trust 
completely/So
mewhat 
15830 96.4 1 
Do not trust 
very much/not 
at all 
515 3.1 0 
N 16345 1424
3 
  
CONF_GVT 
V115- How much 
confidence do you have 
in the government (in 
your nation’s capital) 
A great 
deal/Quite a lot 
6917 32% 
1.0 
Not very 
much/not at all 
8490 52% 
0.0 
N 15407 93.8   
MEMBERSHIP_
MEAN 
V25 to V35: 
Active/Inactive Member 
in Church, Sport, Art, 
Labor Union, Political 
Party, Environmental, 
Professional, 
Humanitarian, Consumer, 
Self-Help or Other 
Organization 
0 11003 67.0 
Mean 
value 
  
0.09 to 2 5419 33.0 
N 16442   
JUSTIFIED_STE
ALING 
Justifiable: Stealing 
property 
Never 
justifiable 
11734 71.5 
1.0 
2 1711 10.4 
3 to 9 906 5.5 
0 Always 
justifiable 
127 .8 
N 16110 98.1  
Table 7: Main features of regression variables 
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 Each of the independent variable measure one dimension of social 
capital. These variables are used in a probit regression in order to explain the 
impact of a change of the probability of robberies to occur in the 
respondent’s closest space of residency. If the relationship is negative 
between the independent and dependent variable, it would mean that having 
more social capital would lower the probability of robberies occurring. 
Regression results are summarized in table 8 below. The model is significant 
as a whole, with a very low Pseudo R2, which is normal since no socio-
economic variables are included in the model. Estimators are all negative and 
statistically significant. The probability of occurrence of robberies decreases 
with each change in the independent variables (moving from 0 to 1 for 
binary variables): Trusting family decreases the probability by 8.7%, Having 
confidence in the government by 6.9%, being a member of social 
organizations by 3% and not justifying stealing by 10%. 
 Nbr of obs 14840  
LR 
chi2(
4) 224.25 
Log 
likeliho
od = 
  -
8681.4
39 
 
Prob > 
chi2 0.000  
Pseud
o R2 0.0128   
ROBBERIES dF/dx Std. Err. z   P>z x-bar  
 [    
95% C.I.   ] 
TRUST_FAMILY -0.087449 
0.023121
7 -3.97 0.000 
0.9689
35 
-
0.1327
7 
-
0.0421
3 
CONFIDENCE_GVT 
-
0.0690712 0.00736 -9.29 0.000 
0.4488
54 
-
0.0835 
-
0.0546
5 
MEMBERSHIP 
-
0.0306241 
0.010687
4 -2.87 0.004 
0.1588
29 
-
0.0515
7 
-
0.0096
8 
JUSTIFIED_STEALI
NG 
-
0.1038407 0.010743 -10.07 0.000 
0.8358
49 
-
0.1249 
-
0.0827
9 
obs. P    .2795822 pred. P    
.277135  
(at x-bar)      
Table 8: Regression results ROBBERIES / Pool of countries 
 
Conclusion 
 Measuring unrest by the occurrence of robberies, we showed that 
social capital explain unrest in Arab countries. More importantly, we found 
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that norms of reciprocity are the main determinant of social order. People’s 
perceptions of others’ behavior can create instability. Norms of 
trustworthiness, and especially norms of reciprocity such as norms that 
proscribe stealing private property, have more significant impacts on stability 
than the volume of social capital. Civic norms and levels of trust have a 
negative and significant impact on property crimes, and can enhance social 
and political stability. Limitations of this article are the scarcity of literature 
on social capital in Arab countries, the absence of important data concerning 
Syria and other Arab countries, the on-going unstable situation in most Arab 
countries, and the reliability of data. Further research must include socio-
economic variables to consolidate the impact of norms on social order. 
Predicting the occurrence of future uprisings depends on the strength of 
social ties.  
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Appendix 1:  
Socio-economic variables differences in TRUSTWORTHINESS scores 
  
MAL
E 
FEMAL
E 
NONUNI
V 
UNI
V 
LOWE
R 
UPPE
R 
AGE<3
0 
AGE>3
0 
Egypt 2.23 2.11 2.18 1.98 2.14 2.2 2.26 2.11 
Libya 1.76 2.05 1.88 1.91 1.91 1.88 1.91 1.90 
Tunisia 2.03 1.85 1.99 1.67 1.97 1.75 2.07 1.86 
Yemen 1.41 2.46 1.99 1.55 1.9 2.09 2.04 1.86 
MEAN 1.86 2.12 2.01 1.78 1.98 1.98 2.07 1.93 
Bahrain 2.23 1.95 2.13 2.02 2.06 2.26 2.06 2.13 
Iraq 2.27 2.32 2.3 2.26 2.18 2.62 2.35 2.26 
Lebano
n 
3.07 3.08 3.13 2.96 3.13 2.94 
3.15 3.02 
Palestin
e 
2.57 2.38 2.44 2.54 2.48 2.43 
2.54 2.44 
MEAN 2.54 2.43 2.5 2.45 2.46 2.56 2.53 2.46 
Algeria 3.61 3.24 3.36 3.7 3.37 3.64 3.77 3.23 
Jordan 1.78 1.54 1.68 1.6 1.57 2.15 1.77 1.61 
Kuwait 2.71 2.84 2.85 2.65 2.67 2.84 3.11 2.57 
Morocc
o 
1.66 1.56 1.61 1.66 1.65 1.73 
1.67 1.56 
Qatar 2.08 1.92 2.03 1.95 1.96 2.01 2.05 1.96 
MEAN 2.37 2.22 2.3 2.31 2.25 2.47 2.48 2.19 
N 8208 8169 12085 4257 11302 4483 5550 10830 
Table 9: Socio-economic explanation for Trustworthiness  
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**People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, 
the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to the: 1 Upper class; 2 Upper middle class; 3 Lower middle class; 
4 Working class; 5 Lower class. 
UPPER: 1 and 2 recoded into 1 
LOWER: 3 to 5 recoded into 0 
 
*What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if 
respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to 
complete]: 1 No formal education; 2 Incomplete primary school; 3 Complete 
primary school; 4 Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type; 5 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type; 6 Incomplete 
secondary: university-preparatory type; 7 Complete secondary: university-
preparatory type; 8 Some university-level education, without degree; 9 
University-level education, with degree 
UNIV: 8 and 9 recoded into 1 
NON UNIV: 1 to 7 recoded into 0 
 
  
